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Many	  political	  theorists,	  philosophers,	  and	  IR	  scholars	  argue	  that	  states	  are	  
‘corporate	  moral	  agents’,	  which	  can	  be	  held	  responsible	  in	  many	  of	  the	  same	  
ways	  as	  individual	  moral	  agents.	  States	  can	  have	  debts,	  contractual	  obligations,	  
reparative	  obligations,	  and	  duties.	  Should	  states	  also	  be	  subject	  to	  criminal	  
responsibility	  and	  punishment?	  Thus	  far,	  the	  debate	  about	  state	  crime	  has	  
focused	  on	  two	  general	  problems	  with	  corporate	  crime:	  whether	  corporate	  
entities	  can	  have	  intentions	  (or	  mens	  rea);	  and	  whether	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  punish	  
them.	  In	  this	  article,	  I	  identify	  two	  problems	  with	  extending	  corporate	  criminal	  
responsibility	  to	  the	  state.	  First,	  since	  there	  is	  no	  ‘international	  corporate	  law’	  
that	  regulates	  the	  internal	  structures	  of	  states,	  many	  states	  fail	  to	  meet	  the	  
conditions	  for	  corporate	  agency	  (and	  hence	  for	  criminal	  responsibility).	  Second,	  
since	  the	  most	  serious	  international	  crimes	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  a	  statute	  of	  
limitations,	  the	  argument	  for	  state	  crime	  paves	  the	  way	  for	  forms	  of	  ‘historical	  
punishment’	  that	  few	  of	  its	  proponents	  would	  accept.	  Finally,	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  
unnecessary	  to	  hold	  states	  criminally	  responsible,	  and	  that	  state	  responsibility	  
ought	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  reparative	  rather	  than	  punitive.	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   The	  practice	  of	  holding	  states	  responsible	  was	  commonly	  understood	  as	  
punitive	  until	  shortly	  after	  the	  First	  World	  War.	  Some	  acts	  of	  state,	  such	  as	  
aggression	  and	  piracy,	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  crimes;	  wars	  and	  sanctions	  were	  
considered	  to	  be	  legitimate	  punishments.1	  But	  under	  current	  international	  law,	  
only	  individuals	  are	  subject	  to	  criminal	  responsibility	  and	  punishment.	  The	  
Nuremberg	  Tribunal’s	  oft-­‐quoted	  statement	  that	  ‘[c]rimes	  against	  international	  
law	  are	  committed	  by	  men,	  not	  by	  abstract	  entities’	  remains	  the	  rule.2	  States	  can	  
be	  responsible	  for	  ‘wrongful	  acts’	  and	  ‘serious	  breaches’,	  and	  they	  can	  owe	  
reparations,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  criminal	  responsibility	  or	  punishment.3	  
	   Some	  political	  theorists,	  philosophers,	  IR	  scholars,	  and	  lawyers	  have	  
recently	  revived	  the	  idea	  of	  state	  crime.4	  They	  argue	  that	  states	  should	  be	  held	  
criminally	  responsible	  for	  atrocities	  such	  as	  aggression	  and	  genocide,	  much	  as	  
corporations	  are	  held	  criminally	  responsible	  in	  domestic	  law.	  Critics	  reply	  that	  
the	  idea	  of	  state	  crime	  is	  conceptually	  confused:	  ‘it	  is	  untenable	  to	  treat	  [states’]	  
legal	  and	  moral	  personality	  as	  anything	  other	  than	  metaphorical	  or	  “as-­‐if”;	  they	  
therefore	  can	  neither	  commit	  crimes	  nor	  incur	  punishment’.5	  States	  cannot	  
commit	  crimes	  because	  they	  do	  not	  have	  intentions,	  and	  they	  cannot	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  all	  wars	  and	  sanctions	  were	  understood	  as	  punitive,	  only	  
that	  punishment	  was	  a	  commonly	  accepted	  justification	  for	  wars	  and	  sanctions.	  
See	  Blum	  2013,	  63-­‐73	  on	  the	  rise	  and	  gradual	  decline	  of	  punitive	  conceptions	  of	  
state	  responsibility	  and	  Luban	  2011b	  on	  punitive	  war.	  	  
2	  Nuremberg	  Tribunal	  1947,	  221.	  See	  also	  Crawford	  and	  Watkins	  2010,	  285:	  
‘there	  has	  been	  no	  development	  of	  corporate	  criminal	  responsibility	  to	  parallel	  
the	  introduction	  of	  individual	  criminal	  responsibility	  on	  the	  international	  plane’.	  
3	  ILC	  2001,	  Articles	  31,	  40.	  See	  Crawford	  2013	  on	  the	  law	  of	  state	  responsibility.	  
4	  Proponents	  of	  holding	  states	  criminally	  responsible	  include	  Lang	  2007,	  2008,	  
2011;	  Jørgensen	  2000;	  Luban	  2011a;	  Pasternak	  2019;	  Pellet	  1999;	  and	  Tanguay-­‐
Renaud	  2013.	  The	  arguments	  for	  state	  crime	  are	  varied.	  In	  this	  article,	  I	  focus	  on	  
the	  dominant	  line	  of	  argument,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  ‘corporate	  moral	  
agency’.	  
5	  Gould	  2009,	  702,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  See	  also	  Carron	  1998;	  Fleming	  2017.	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punished	  because	  they	  cannot	  suffer.	  In	  addition,	  both	  proponents	  and	  critics	  of	  
state	  crime	  worry	  about	  ‘the	  danger	  of	  harming	  innocent	  individuals	  while	  
ostensibly	  punishing	  delinquent	  states’.6	  The	  debate	  about	  state	  crime	  revolves	  
around	  two	  issues—intent	  and	  punishment—that	  have	  dominated	  the	  more	  
general	  debate	  about	  corporate	  criminal	  responsibility	  for	  decades	  or	  even	  
centuries.7	  
	   In	  the	  interest	  of	  moving	  the	  debate	  forward,	  I	  bracket	  the	  issues	  of	  
corporate	  intent	  and	  punishment.	  I	  assume	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument	  that	  the	  
concept	  of	  corporate	  crime	  is	  sound:	  that	  corporate	  entities	  can	  be	  genuine	  
agents,	  and	  that	  they	  can	  sensibly	  be	  punished.	  I	  also	  put	  aside	  the	  more	  general	  
problem	  of	  enforcing	  international	  law.	  Instead,	  I	  focus	  on	  two	  problems	  with	  
holding	  states	  criminally	  responsible	  that	  have	  received	  much	  less	  attention.	  The	  
first	  I	  call	  the	  Agency	  Problem:	  only	  agents	  can	  be	  held	  criminally	  responsible,	  
but	  many	  states	  fail	  to	  meet	  the	  conditions	  for	  corporate	  agency.	  The	  second	  I	  
call	  the	  Temporal	  Problem:	  since	  the	  most	  serious	  international	  crimes	  are	  not	  
subject	  to	  a	  statute	  of	  limitations,	  the	  argument	  for	  state	  crime	  implies	  that	  
states	  should	  be	  punished	  for	  decades-­‐old	  or	  even	  centuries-­‐old	  crimes.	  
	   These	  problems	  do	  not	  undermine	  the	  conceptual	  possibility	  of	  state	  
crime.8	  By	  starting	  from	  the	  assumption	  that	  corporate	  entities	  can	  be	  genuine	  
agents,	  I	  have	  already	  granted	  that	  it	  is	  conceptually	  coherent	  to	  hold	  states	  
criminally	  responsible.	  What	  the	  Agency	  Problem	  and	  Temporal	  Problem	  show	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  Erskine	  2010,	  263;	  Luban	  2011b;	  Vernon	  2011;	  Wringe	  2016,	  155,	  168.	  	  
7	  Coffee	  1981.	  In	  the	  thirteenth	  century,	  Pope	  Innocent	  IV	  declared	  that	  
corporate	  bodies	  are	  ‘personae	  fictae’	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  be	  guilty	  or	  be	  
punished.	  Dewey	  1926,	  665.	  
8	  If	  there	  are	  decisive	  objections	  to	  holding	  states	  criminally	  responsible,	  then	  
they	  will	  probably	  have	  to	  do	  with	  the	  old	  problems	  of	  corporate	  intent	  and	  
punishment.	  See	  Gould	  2009.	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is	  the	  argument	  for	  state	  crime	  faces	  formidable	  challenges	  even	  when	  its	  central	  
premises	  have	  been	  granted.	  These	  two	  problems	  are	  best	  understood	  as	  
critiques	  rather	  than	  as	  decisive	  objections;	  they	  limit	  the	  scope	  of	  state	  crime	  
and	  pose	  difficult	  tradeoffs.	  
	   In	  any	  case,	  I	  argue,	  it	  is	  unnecessary	  to	  hold	  states	  criminally	  
responsible.	  A	  wide	  range	  of	  responses	  to	  atrocity	  can	  be	  justified	  in	  purely	  
reparative	  terms,	  including	  compensation,	  official	  apologies,	  lustration,	  and	  
institutional	  reform.	  And	  if	  an	  outlet	  for	  punishment	  is	  necessary	  in	  the	  
international	  order,	  then	  it	  can	  already	  be	  found	  in	  criminal	  trials	  of	  individuals.	  I	  
thus	  defend	  the	  existing	  ‘division	  of	  labour’	  between	  international	  criminal	  law,	  
which	  is	  primarily	  for	  punishing	  individuals,	  and	  state	  responsibility,	  which	  is	  
wholly	  reparative.	  Defending	  the	  status	  quo	  is	  a	  larger	  contribution	  to	  the	  debate	  
than	  it	  may	  seem.	  The	  current	  system	  of	  international	  responsibility	  has	  been	  
subjected	  to	  sustained	  criticism	  and	  is	  in	  need	  of	  a	  better	  defence.	  Partisans	  of	  
the	  current	  system	  have	  so	  far	  provided	  only	  a	  negative	  defence.	  They	  argue	  
against	  extending	  criminal	  responsibility	  to	  the	  state,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  provide	  an	  
argument	  for	  the	  current	  system,	  or	  a	  positive	  vision	  of	  what	  ‘non-­‐criminal’	  state	  
responsibility	  should	  be.	  
	  	   The	  article	  has	  four	  main	  sections.	  The	  first	  section	  presents	  the	  strongest	  
and	  most	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  arguments	  for	  corporate	  criminal	  responsibility.	  In	  addition	  
to	  the	  philosophical	  literature	  on	  corporate	  agency,	  I	  draw	  from	  recent	  
jurisprudence	  and	  legal	  history	  on	  corporate	  crime.	  The	  second	  section	  describes	  
the	  Agency	  Problem,	  which	  presents	  a	  barrier	  to	  any	  simple	  extension	  of	  
corporate	  crime	  to	  the	  state.	  Many	  states	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  conditions	  for	  
corporate	  agency,	  and	  the	  others	  meet	  the	  conditions	  only	  in	  a	  limited	  sense.	  The	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third	  section	  describes	  the	  Temporal	  Problem.	  I	  show	  that	  the	  argument	  for	  state	  
crime	  paves	  the	  way	  for	  forms	  of	  ‘historical	  punishment’	  that	  few	  proponents	  of	  
state	  crime	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  accept.	  The	  fourth	  section	  argues	  that	  
abandoning	  the	  idea	  of	  state	  crime	  would	  be	  no	  great	  loss.	  Most	  responses	  to	  
atrocity	  can	  be	  justified	  in	  reparative	  terms,	  and	  international	  criminal	  law	  
already	  provides	  an	  outlet	  for	  punishment.	  	  
	  
The	  case	  for	  corporate	  criminal	  responsibility	  
	   A	  crime	  has	  two	  elements:	  actus	  reus	  (guilty	  act)	  and	  mens	  rea	  (guilty	  
mind).	  In	  order	  for	  an	  agent	  to	  be	  criminally	  responsible,	  it	  must	  have	  (1)	  
performed	  an	  illegal	  act	  and	  (2)	  done	  so	  intentionally.9	  There	  are	  some	  
exceptions,	  such	  as	  strict	  liability	  offences.10	  There	  are	  also	  some	  structural	  or	  
institutional	  preconditions	  for	  criminal	  responsibility,	  such	  as	  the	  need	  for	  an	  
impartial	  authority	  that	  can	  make	  criminal	  judgments	  against	  the	  relevant	  
agents.11	  But	  it	  is	  widely	  agreed	  that	  these	  two	  conditions—act	  and	  intent—are	  
necessary.	  At	  a	  minimum,	  then,	  an	  entity	  must	  be	  capable	  of	  both	  actus	  reus	  and	  
mens	  rea	  in	  order	  to	  be	  fit	  for	  criminal	  responsibility.	  	  
	   The	  theory	  of	  corporate	  moral	  agency	  provides	  a	  powerful	  justification	  
for	  holding	  groups	  responsible.	  The	  core	  idea	  is	  that	  groups	  with	  certain	  kinds	  of	  
internal	  structures	  constitute	  genuine	  agents,	  over	  and	  above	  their	  individual	  
members.	  Whereas	  an	  ‘aggregate’	  group,	  such	  as	  a	  mob,	  is	  merely	  a	  collection	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  E.g.,	  Allen	  2017,	  31-­‐120.	  I	  follow	  both	  proponents	  and	  critics	  of	  state	  crime	  in	  
employing	  the	  standard	  act-­‐intent	  model	  of	  crime.	  
10	  A	  strict	  liability	  offence	  is	  one	  that	  does	  not	  require	  mens	  rea.	  For	  instance,	  in	  
some	  jurisdictions,	  the	  crime	  of	  impaired	  driving	  does	  not	  require	  intent;	  one	  
can	  be	  convicted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  act	  alone.	  
11	  Jørgensen	  2000,	  217;	  Lang	  2008,	  138-­‐39.	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individuals	  whose	  wills	  converge	  or	  coincide,	  a	  ‘conglomerate’	  or	  ‘corporate’	  
group	  has	  a	  centralized	  decision-­‐making	  procedure	  that	  combines	  the	  wills	  of	  its	  
members	  into	  an	  overarching	  corporate	  will.12	  As	  Toni	  Erskine	  argues,	  a	  
corporate	  group	  is	  ‘capable	  of	  acting	  and	  knowing	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  analogous—
but	  not	  identical—to	  that	  of	  (most)	  individual	  human	  beings’.13	  The	  theory	  of	  
corporate	  moral	  agency	  has	  been	  applied	  to	  organizations	  of	  various	  kinds,	  
including	  business	  corporations,	  churches,	  universities,	  nongovernmental	  
organizations,	  rebel	  groups,	  and,	  as	  I	  discuss	  below,	  states.14	  	  
	   The	  claim	  that	  groups	  can	  have	  wills	  or	  intentions	  tends	  to	  provoke	  
skepticism.	  However,	  philosophers	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  collective	  
intentionality	  is	  less	  mysterious	  than	  it	  seems.15	  Collective	  intentions	  ‘holistically	  
supervene’	  on	  individual	  intentions:	  the	  former	  are	  composed	  of	  but	  not	  
reducible	  to	  the	  latter.16	  Deborah	  Tollefsen	  uses	  the	  example	  of	  a	  PhD	  
admissions	  committee	  to	  illustrate	  how	  collective	  intentions	  can	  emerge	  from	  
the	  structured	  combination	  of	  individual	  intentions.17	  The	  admissions	  procedure	  
says	  that	  applicants	  must	  demonstrate	  excellence	  in	  all	  four	  areas—writing,	  
numeracy,	  creativity,	  and	  motivation—in	  order	  to	  be	  admitted,	  and	  the	  
committee	  uses	  majority	  voting	  to	  decide	  whether	  the	  applicants	  meet	  the	  
criteria.	  The	  results	  for	  Molly’s	  application	  are	  as	  follows.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  French	  1984,	  29-­‐48.	  
13	  Erskine	  2001,	  70.	  See	  also	  Goodin	  1995,	  Chapter	  2;	  Stilz	  2011;	  Wendt	  1999,	  
2004.	  	  
14	  See	  Fleming	  2017,	  Mansell	  et	  al.	  2019,	  and	  Tollefsen	  2015	  for	  reviews	  of	  the	  
literature	  on	  corporate	  agency.	  
15	  Corporate	  agency	  and	  responsibility	  remain	  somewhat	  controversial	  among	  
philosophers.	  For	  recent	  criticisms,	  see	  Baddorf	  2017	  and	  Overgaard	  and	  Salice	  
forthcoming.	  
16	  List	  and	  Pettit	  2011.	  
17	  Tollefsen	  2015,	  60-­‐62.	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Table	  1.	  Tollefsen’s	  admissions	  committee	  
	   Writing?	   Numeracy?	   Creativity?	   Motivation?	   Admit	  to	  
program?	  
Member	  #1	   Yes	   No	   Yes	   No	   No	  
Member	  #2	   No	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   No	  
Member	  #3	   Yes	   Yes	   No	   Yes	   No	  
Committee	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
	  
The	  vote	  produces	  a	  peculiar	  result.	  Although	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  committee	  thinks	  
Molly	  meets	  each	  criterion	  for	  admission,	  none	  of	  the	  individual	  committee	  
members	  think	  Molly	  meets	  all	  of	  the	  criteria.	  The	  committee	  intends	  to	  admit	  
Molly	  to	  the	  PhD	  program	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  none	  of	  its	  members	  has	  this	  
intention:	  ‘We	  intend	  to	  admit	  Molly’	  is	  true	  for	  the	  committee	  even	  though	  ‘I	  
intend	  to	  admit	  Molly’	  is	  not	  true	  for	  any	  individual	  member.	  The	  admissions	  
procedure	  thus	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  collective	  intention	  that	  cannot	  be	  ascribed	  to	  any	  
individual.	  The	  holistic	  supervenience	  account	  of	  collective	  intentionality	  implies	  
that	  collective	  intentions	  are	  irreducible	  to	  individual	  intentions	  even	  though	  
they	  are	  entirely	  made	  up	  of	  individual	  intentions.	  
	   If	  we	  accept	  that	  corporate	  groups	  can	  have	  intentions,	  even	  in	  this	  very	  
thin	  sense,	  then	  corporate	  criminal	  responsibility	  is	  a	  short	  step	  away.	  As	  Philip	  
Pettit	  argues,	  	  
	   corporate	  bodies	  are	  fit	  to	  be	  held	  responsible	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  
	   individual	  agents,	  and	  this	  entails	  that	  it	  may	  therefore	  be	  appropriate	  to	  
	   make	  them	  criminally	  liable	  for	  some	  things	  done	  in	  their	  name;	  they	  may	  
	   display	  a	  guilty	  mind,	  a	  mens	  rea,	  as	  in	  intentional	  malice,	  malice	  with	  
	   foresight,	  negligence,	  or	  recklessness.18	  	  
	  
Corporations	  are	  often	  said	  to	  act—to	  commit	  fraud,	  or	  to	  pollute	  the	  
environment—and	  to	  do	  so	  intentionally.	  It	  is	  common	  and	  natural	  to	  say	  that	  
‘the	  company	  intentionally	  misled	  its	  customers’	  or	  that	  ‘the	  company	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Pettit	  2007,	  176.	  See	  also	  Isaacs	  2013.	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deliberately	  violated	  environmental	  law’.19	  Criminal	  corporate	  actions	  and	  
intentions	  seem	  to	  demand	  corporate	  criminal	  responsibility.	  	  
	   The	  idea	  of	  corporate	  agency	  has	  recently	  been	  taken	  up	  in	  law	  and	  
jurisprudence.20	  The	  legal	  literature	  both	  draws	  from	  and	  complements	  the	  
philosophical	  literature.	  First,	  the	  idea	  of	  corporate	  agency	  places	  corporate	  
criminal	  law	  on	  a	  firm	  ontological	  footing	  and	  therefore	  eliminates	  the	  need	  for	  
the	  ‘fiction	  theory’	  of	  the	  corporation.	  Second,	  the	  legal	  literature	  helps	  to	  explain	  
how,	  in	  practice,	  corporations	  are	  constituted	  as	  agents.	  As	  William	  Thomas	  
shows,	  corporations	  became	  agents	  under	  the	  criminal	  law	  only	  when	  corporate	  
law	  began	  to	  regulate	  their	  internal	  structures	  in	  a	  particular	  way.	  Corporations	  
are	  fit	  to	  be	  held	  criminally	  responsible	  because	  ‘corporate	  law	  provides	  
corporations	  with	  the	  kind	  of	  sophisticated	  internal	  structure	  necessary	  to	  
establish	  their	  eligibility	  for	  personhood’.21	  	  
	   It	  may	  seem	  straightforward	  to	  extend	  the	  argument	  for	  corporate	  
criminal	  responsibility	  to	  the	  state.	  Like	  corporations,	  states	  have	  complex	  
decision-­‐making	  procedures	  that	  allow	  them	  to	  deliberate,	  to	  set	  goals,	  and	  to	  act	  
according	  to	  those	  goals.	  It	  is	  therefore	  plausible	  to	  conclude	  that	  states	  should	  
also	  be	  held	  criminally	  responsible.22	  As	  Avia	  Pasternak	  argues,	  ‘if	  states	  are	  
corporate	  moral	  agents,	  they	  too	  could	  be	  subjected	  to	  a	  process	  of	  criminal	  
accountability,	  where	  they	  are	  put	  to	  trial,	  publicly	  condemned	  for	  their	  crimes,	  
and	  (where	  appropriate)	  punished’.23	  The	  argument	  for	  holding	  states	  criminally	  
responsible	  seems	  even	  more	  compelling	  in	  light	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  most	  serious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Copp	  2006.	  
20	  Chiao	  2014;	  Rich	  2016;	  Tanguay-­‐Renaud	  2013;	  Thomas	  2017,	  2018.	  
21	  Thomas	  2017,	  634.	  
22	  Supra	  note	  4.	  
23	  Pasternak	  2019,	  368.	  
	   8	  
international	  crimes—genocide,	  aggression,	  war	  crimes,	  and	  crimes	  against	  
humanity—are	  usually	  perpetrated,	  or	  at	  least	  aided	  and	  abetted,	  by	  states.	  
States	  commit	  genocide,	  and	  they	  do	  so	  intentionally;	  and	  genocide	  is	  clearly	  a	  
crime;	  so	  it	  seems	  that	  genocidal	  states	  must	  be	  criminals.24	  	  
	  
The	  agency	  problem	  
	   Extending	  corporate	  criminal	  responsibility	  to	  the	  state	  is	  not	  as	  simple	  as	  
it	  sounds.	  Even	  if	  states	  can	  be	  corporate	  agents,	  there	  is	  no	  guarantee	  that	  any	  
particular	  state	  will	  meet	  the	  conditions	  for	  corporate	  agency.	  It	  turns	  out	  that	  
many	  of	  the	  states	  that	  commit	  criminal	  actions	  are	  not	  ‘fit	  to	  stand	  trial’	  in	  the	  
first	  place.	  The	  Agency	  Problem	  places	  limits	  on	  the	  kinds	  of	  states	  that	  can	  be	  
held	  criminally	  responsible	  and	  on	  the	  kinds	  of	  measures	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  
punish	  states.	  
	   Before	  turning	  to	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  some	  states	  fail	  to	  meet	  the	  
conditions	  for	  corporate	  agency,	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  turn	  back	  to	  corporations.	  As	  
Thomas	  shows,	  developments	  in	  corporate	  law	  made	  corporate	  criminal	  
responsibility	  possible.	  	  
	   The	  expanded	  availability	  of	  the	  corporate	  form,	  the	  relaxing	  of	  
	   corporate-­‐purpose	  requirements,	  and	  the	  general	  liberalization	  of	  
	   corporate	  law	  during	  and	  immediately	  following	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  
	   enabled	  the	  creation	  and	  proliferation	  of	  corporate	  persons	  sophisticated	  
	   enough	  to	  be	  eligible	  for	  legal	  personhood	  under	  criminal	  law,	  and	  
	   specifically	  to	  satisfy	  criminal	  law’s	  mens	  rea	  requirement.25	  
	  
Corporations	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  conditions	  for	  agency	  spontaneously.	  Instead,	  
‘corporate	  law	  plays	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  making	  possible	  corporate-­‐criminal	  liability	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Lang	  2011.	  
25	  Thomas	  2018,	  514.	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by	  designing	  corporations	  to	  be	  the	  kind	  of	  things	  that	  can	  qualify	  as	  persons’.26	  
In	  particular,	  corporate	  law	  imposes	  a	  decision-­‐making	  structure	  that	  is	  
conducive	  to	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  unified	  and	  (more	  or	  less)	  consistent	  set	  of	  
corporate	  attitudes	  and	  intentions—like	  the	  admissions	  committee	  in	  the	  
previous	  section.	  Obviously,	  not	  all	  corporations	  are	  genuine	  agents;	  shell	  
companies	  are	  merely	  pseudo-­‐agents.	  But	  most	  corporations	  do	  meet	  the	  
conditions	  for	  agency,	  and	  this	  is	  primarily	  because	  corporate	  law	  ensures	  that	  
they	  function	  as	  agents.	  	  
	   However,	  there	  is	  no	  ‘international	  corporate	  law’	  that	  regulates	  the	  
internal	  structures	  of	  states.	  There	  is	  consequently	  no	  guarantee	  that	  states	  will	  
meet	  the	  conditions	  for	  corporate	  agency.	  	  
	   In	  order	  to	  determine	  which	  states	  do	  or	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  conditions,	  it	  is	  
first	  necessary	  to	  determine	  what	  is	  meant	  by	  ‘the	  state’.	  Proponents	  of	  the	  idea	  
that	  the	  state	  is	  a	  corporate	  agent	  all	  agree	  that	  the	  state	  is	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  
organization	  or	  institution:	  a	  group	  of	  human	  beings	  who	  act	  together	  according	  
to	  a	  common	  decision-­‐making	  procedure.27	  There	  obviously	  cannot	  be	  a	  state	  
without	  members	  or	  without	  decision-­‐making	  rules.	  The	  main	  difficulty	  is	  how	  
to	  determine	  the	  state’s	  membership.	  Holly	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  distinguishes	  two	  
models	  of	  the	  state.28	  The	  ‘citizen-­‐exclusive’	  state	  includes	  only	  government	  
officials	  (from	  presidents	  to	  low-­‐level	  bureaucrats),	  whereas	  the	  ‘citizen-­‐
inclusive’	  state	  includes	  both	  government	  officials	  and	  the	  voting	  public.	  One	  
well	  known	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  account	  comes	  from	  David	  Easton,	  who	  argues	  that	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Thomas	  2017,	  636.	  
27	  Erskine	  2001;	  Goodin	  1995;	  ILC	  2001;	  Lang	  2007;	  Stilz	  2011.	  
28	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  2019.	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the	  state	  is	  ‘no	  more	  than	  a	  substitute	  term	  for	  the	  political	  authorities’.29	  
Theorists	  of	  corporate	  agency,	  and	  political	  theorists	  more	  generally,	  tend	  to	  
employ	  citizen-­‐inclusive	  accounts	  of	  the	  state.	  For	  instance,	  Toni	  Erskine	  argues	  
that	  ‘the	  membership	  of	  the	  state—in	  the	  form	  of	  its	  citizens—is	  not	  
determinate’.30	  I	  argue,	  first,	  that	  many	  actual	  states	  fail	  to	  meet	  the	  conditions	  
for	  corporate	  agency	  on	  either	  model;	  and	  second	  (following	  Lawford-­‐Smith),	  
that	  the	  states	  that	  do	  meet	  the	  conditions	  for	  corporate	  agency	  do	  so	  only	  on	  the	  
citizen-­‐exclusive	  model.	  
	   Failed	  states	  fail	  to	  meet	  the	  conditions	  for	  corporate	  agency	  on	  either	  
model.	  What	  makes	  them	  ‘failed’	  is	  that	  their	  decision-­‐making	  procedures	  are	  
too	  weak	  or	  chaotic	  to	  produce	  a	  relatively	  coherent	  set	  of	  corporate	  intentions.	  
In	  Peter	  French’s	  terms,	  they	  are	  more	  like	  ‘aggregates’	  than	  ‘conglomerates’.31	  
In	  addition,	  as	  Erskine	  argues,	  there	  are	  many	  ‘quasi-­‐states’	  that	  lack	  the	  
freedom	  or	  independence	  to	  fully	  exercise	  their	  moral	  agency.32	  Although	  a	  
quasi-­‐state	  may	  have	  a	  centralized	  decision-­‐making	  procedure,	  its	  responsibility	  
for	  its	  decisions	  is	  mitigated	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  these	  decisions	  are	  determined	  by	  
other	  states	  or	  by	  outside	  forces.	  
	   Dictatorships	  also	  fail	  to	  meet	  the	  conditions	  for	  corporate	  agency	  on	  
either	  model.	  As	  it	  turns	  out,	  many	  proponents	  of	  state	  crime	  would	  agree.	  
Anthony	  Lang	  argues	  that	  ‘when	  a	  dictatorial	  regime	  commits	  a	  crime,	  it	  makes	  
more	  sense	  to	  attribute	  that	  crime	  to	  the	  head	  of	  state,	  in	  that	  the	  policy	  results	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Easton	  1981,	  316.	  
30	  Erskine	  2001,	  74.	  See	  also	  Goodin	  1995;	  Pasternak	  2011;	  Stilz	  2011.	  
31	  French	  1984,	  29-­‐48	  
32	  Erskine	  2001.	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from	  his	  individual	  intention’.33	  Similarly,	  Pettit	  argues	  that	  a	  dictatorship	  ought	  
to	  be	  treated	  ‘not	  as	  a	  group	  agent	  that	  operates	  via	  an	  authorized	  individual,	  but	  
as	  an	  individual	  agent	  whose	  reach	  and	  power	  is	  extended	  and	  amplified	  by	  the	  
members	  of	  the	  authorizing	  group’.34	  	  
	   The	  crucial	  but	  unstated	  premise	  here	  is	  that	  the	  agent	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  
action	  is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  corresponding	  intention.	  For	  instance,	  I	  am	  the	  agent	  
in	  relation	  to	  writing	  this	  article	  because	  I	  am	  the	  source	  of	  the	  intention	  to	  write	  
it.	  As	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  points	  out,	  it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  treat	  a	  whole	  group	  as	  
an	  agent	  simply	  because	  there	  is	  a	  source	  of	  intentionality	  somewhere	  within	  the	  
group.35	  This	  is	  easiest	  to	  see	  in	  a	  small-­‐scale	  example.	  Suppose	  that	  there	  are	  
four	  people	  rowing	  down	  a	  river	  in	  a	  boat.	  If	  the	  rowers	  come	  to	  a	  fork	  in	  the	  
river,	  and	  they	  decide	  together	  to	  take	  the	  right	  fork,	  then	  the	  group	  of	  four	  is	  the	  
source	  of	  the	  intention	  to	  take	  the	  right	  fork.	  They	  would	  all	  be	  to	  blame	  if	  the	  
right	  fork	  led	  them	  over	  a	  waterfall.	  But	  if	  one	  rower	  forces	  the	  boat	  to	  the	  right,	  
or	  coerces	  the	  others	  into	  going	  right	  instead	  of	  left,	  then	  he	  is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  
intention	  to	  take	  the	  right	  fork.	  He	  would	  therefore	  be	  solely	  to	  blame	  if	  taking	  
the	  right	  fork	  led	  to	  disaster.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  other	  three	  remain	  in	  the	  boat,	  and	  
that	  they	  continue	  to	  row,	  does	  not	  make	  the	  decision	  to	  take	  the	  right	  fork	  
‘theirs’.	  In	  short,	  the	  locus	  of	  agency	  in	  a	  group—and	  hence	  the	  correct	  target	  for	  
criminal	  responsibility—is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  intentionality	  that	  animates	  the	  
group’s	  actions.	  
	   According	  to	  Pettit’s	  and	  Lang’s	  logic,	  then,	  a	  dictatorship	  is	  analogous	  to	  
the	  boat	  that	  is	  steered	  by	  a	  single	  rower.	  The	  source	  of	  the	  state’s	  intentionality,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Lang	  2007,	  245.	  
34	  Pettit	  2014,	  1649.	  
35	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  2019,	  32,	  82.	  
	   12	  
and	  hence	  the	  appropriate	  target	  for	  criminal	  responsibility,	  is	  the	  dictator	  qua	  
individual.36	  The	  citizen-­‐inclusive	  state	  is	  not	  a	  corporate	  agent,	  because	  citizens	  
in	  a	  dictatorship	  are	  just	  ‘passengers’	  on	  the	  ship	  of	  state.	  The	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  
state	  is	  not	  a	  corporate	  agent	  either,	  because	  public	  officials	  are	  primarily	  
instruments	  of	  the	  dictator.	  Although	  police	  officers,	  soldiers,	  and	  civil	  servants	  
execute	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  dictatorship,	  they	  are	  not	  the	  source	  of	  its	  intentions;	  
they	  ‘row’	  but	  do	  not	  ‘steer’.	  (As	  I	  explain	  shortly,	  matters	  are	  different	  in	  
bureaucratic-­‐authoritarian	  states,	  including	  those	  that	  are	  superficially	  
dictatorial.)	  Dictatorships	  can	  thus	  be	  understood	  as	  pseudo-­‐corporate	  agents,	  or	  
individual	  agents	  pretending	  to	  be	  corporate	  agents.	  	  
	   The	  case	  of	  oligarchies	  is	  more	  complicated	  and	  varied.	  Scholars	  of	  
authoritarianism	  distinguish	  ‘simple	  military	  authoritarian	  regimes’,	  which	  are	  
run	  from	  the	  top	  by	  a	  small	  junta,	  ‘from	  bureaucratic	  authoritarian	  regimes’,	  
which	  are	  run	  by	  ‘a	  powerful	  group	  of	  technocrats’	  in	  conjunction	  with	  a	  larger	  
bureaucracy.37	  In	  neither	  type	  of	  oligarchy	  is	  the	  citizen-­‐inclusive	  state	  an	  agent,	  
for	  the	  obvious	  reason	  that	  the	  decision-­‐making	  procedure	  does	  not	  include	  
citizens.	  Citizens	  in	  either	  kind	  of	  oligarchy,	  like	  citizens	  in	  a	  dictatorship,	  are	  
‘passengers’	  on	  the	  ship	  of	  state.	  But	  whether	  the	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  state	  counts	  
as	  a	  corporate	  agent	  depends	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  oligarchy.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  Note	  that	  holding	  the	  dictator	  criminally	  responsible	  for	  the	  ‘the	  state’s’	  
actions	  does	  not	  preclude	  holding	  other	  individuals	  criminally	  responsible	  for	  
their	  actions.	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  2019,	  4:	  ‘culpability	  will	  usually	  rest	  with	  the	  
dictator	  alone—although	  others	  may	  yet	  be	  complicit	  in	  what	  he	  or	  she	  does’.	  	  
37	  Gasiorowski	  2006,	  110;	  see	  also	  Linz	  2000.	  There	  are	  plenty	  of	  boundary	  cases	  
between	  the	  two	  types	  of	  oligarchy,	  and	  between	  oligarchy	  and	  dictatorship.	  It	  
will	  sometimes	  be	  unclear	  how	  a	  particular	  state	  should	  be	  categorized,	  and	  
hence	  whether	  it	  is	  fit	  to	  be	  held	  criminally	  responsible.	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   In	  a	  ‘simple’	  oligarchy,	  the	  source	  of	  intentionality	  is	  the	  junta	  rather	  than	  
the	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  state	  as	  a	  whole.	  Soldiers	  and	  officials	  in	  this	  kind	  of	  state	  
are	  largely	  instruments	  of	  the	  junta.	  To	  adapt	  Pettit’s	  phrasing:	  we	  could	  think	  of	  
a	  military	  state	  not	  as	  a	  group	  agent	  that	  operates	  via	  a	  junta,	  but	  as	  a	  junta	  
whose	  reach	  and	  power	  is	  extended	  and	  amplified	  by	  government	  officials	  and	  
the	  military.	  Or	  to	  adapt	  Lang’s	  phrasing:	  when	  a	  military	  state	  commits	  a	  crime,	  
it	  makes	  more	  sense	  to	  attribute	  that	  crime	  to	  the	  junta,	  in	  that	  the	  policy	  results	  
from	  its	  intention	  (as	  opposed	  to	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  whole	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  
state).	  Again,	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  intentionality	  somewhere	  within	  the	  state	  
does	  not	  make	  the	  whole	  state	  an	  agent.	  The	  appropriate	  target	  for	  criminal	  
responsibility	  is	  the	  source	  of	  intentionality,	  or	  the	  locus	  of	  the	  relevant	  mens	  
rea.	  So	  if	  the	  source	  of	  intentionality	  behind	  ‘the	  state’s’	  decisions	  is	  a	  small	  
subgroup,	  such	  as	  a	  junta,	  then	  criminal	  responsibility	  should	  be	  assigned	  to	  that	  
subgroup.38	  	  
	   In	  a	  ‘bureaucratic-­‐authoritarian’	  state,	  the	  source	  of	  intentionality	  does	  
seem	  to	  be	  the	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  state.	  The	  fact	  that	  a	  state	  is	  hierarchically	  
structured	  does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  intentionality	  arises	  solely	  from	  the	  
top	  of	  the	  hierarchy.	  It	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	  assume	  that	  the	  technocratic	  elite	  
is	  the	  only	  corporate	  agent	  or	  that	  the	  bureaucracy	  is	  only	  an	  instrument	  of	  the	  
technocrats.	  Insofar	  as	  the	  bureaucracy	  contributes	  to	  the	  formation	  (rather	  than	  
merely	  the	  execution)	  of	  corporate	  intentions,	  it	  is	  also	  part	  of	  the	  relevant	  
corporate	  agent.	  The	  source	  of	  intentionality	  in	  a	  bureaucratic-­‐authoritarian	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  This	  sort	  of	  responsibility	  does	  have	  a	  legal	  precedent.	  The	  Nuremberg	  Charter	  
allowed	  ‘groups’	  or	  ‘organizations’	  within	  the	  state	  to	  be	  criminalized.	  The	  
Cabinet	  of	  the	  Nazi	  Government,	  the	  SS,	  and	  the	  Gestapo	  were	  all	  declared	  to	  be	  
criminal.	  Jørgensen	  2000,	  59-­‐71.	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state	  will	  typically	  be	  a	  complex	  of	  individuals	  and	  organizations	  that	  is	  roughly	  
coextensive	  with	  the	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  state.	  In	  some	  oligarchies,	  then,	  the	  
citizen-­‐exclusive	  state	  is	  a	  corporate	  agent.39	  	  
	   A	  fortiori,	  in	  democracies,	  the	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  state	  is	  a	  corporate	  agent.	  
The	  legislature,	  executive,	  courts,	  and	  civil	  service	  are	  all	  corporate	  agents	  in	  
their	  own	  right,	  but	  their	  actions	  are	  coordinated	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  they	  can	  act	  
together	  as	  a	  single	  agent.40	  The	  crucial	  question	  is	  whether	  the	  citizen-­‐inclusive	  
state	  counts	  as	  a	  corporate	  agent	  in	  a	  democracy.	  Many	  theorists	  of	  corporate	  
agency	  seem	  to	  think	  so.	  Lang	  argues	  that	  ‘[i]f	  a	  state	  is	  democratic	  and	  initiates	  
a	  policy	  that	  leads	  to	  a	  crime,	  it	  makes	  more	  sense	  to	  attribute	  that	  crime	  to	  the	  
[citizen-­‐inclusive]	  state	  qua	  agent’.41	  Anna	  Stilz	  argues	  that	  if	  citizens	  
democratically	  authorize	  the	  state,	  then	  they	  are	  members	  of	  the	  state	  qua	  
corporate	  agent	  and	  should	  therefore	  share	  liability	  for	  its	  actions.42	  Democracy	  
seems	  to	  make	  the	  whole	  ‘people’	  the	  source	  of	  intentionality,	  and	  hence	  the	  
appropriate	  target	  for	  criminal	  responsibility.	  
	   However,	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  has	  recently	  challenged	  the	  longstanding	  
assumption	  that	  the	  democratic	  ‘state-­‐as-­‐a-­‐whole’	  is	  a	  corporate	  agent.	  Although	  
the	  citizenry	  as	  a	  whole	  is	  capable	  of	  occasional	  ‘joint	  action’—namely,	  voting—
this	  is	  not	  sufficient	  for	  corporate	  agency.	  
	   From	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  coordinating	  infrastructure	  for	  voters	  to	  do	  one	  
	   thing	  together,	  namely	  vote	  (elect	  a	  government	  every	  three	  years	  or	  so),	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  There	  is	  an	  interesting	  question	  about	  whether	  corporations	  in	  their	  current	  
form	  are	  like	  private	  oligarchies.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  the	  ‘employee-­‐exclusive’	  
or	  ‘shareholder-­‐exclusive’	  corporation	  might	  be	  the	  relevant	  agent	  in	  cases	  of	  
corporate	  crime.	  Or	  it	  might	  be	  that	  the	  board	  of	  directors,	  not	  the	  corporation,	  is	  
the	  relevant	  agent.	  	  
40	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  2019,	  81.	  
41	  Lang	  2007,	  245.	  
42	  Stilz	  2011.	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   it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  there	  is	  coordinating	  infrastructure	  for	  them	  to	  act	  
	   together	  in	  general.43	  	  
	  
Voting	  does	  not	  make	  the	  citizenry	  as	  a	  whole	  the	  source	  of	  intentionality	  behind	  
the	  state’s	  actions;	  voting	  is	  merely	  a	  way	  to	  ‘contract	  agency	  out	  to	  a	  subgroup,	  
namely	  government	  [i.e.,	  the	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  state]’.44	  In	  terms	  of	  agency,	  then,	  
a	  democratic	  state	  is	  more	  similar	  to	  a	  bureaucratic-­‐authoritarian	  state	  than	  it	  
first	  appears.	  The	  corporate	  agent	  in	  each	  case	  is	  the	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  state.	  	  
	   So	  far,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  failed	  states,	  dictatorships,	  and	  simple	  
oligarchies	  do	  not	  count	  as	  corporate	  agents	  on	  either	  model	  of	  the	  state,	  and	  
that	  bureaucratic-­‐authoritarian	  and	  democratic	  states	  count	  as	  corporate	  agents	  
only	  on	  the	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  model.	  Two	  important	  implications	  follow.	  
	   First,	  many	  states	  are	  not	  fit	  to	  be	  held	  criminally	  responsible.	  Failed	  
states	  cannot	  form	  mens	  rea	  at	  all,	  and	  the	  mens	  rea	  behind	  the	  actions	  of	  
dictatorships	  and	  simple	  oligarchies	  are	  really	  the	  intentions	  of	  individuals	  or	  
small	  subgroups	  within	  the	  state.	  Only	  bureaucratic-­‐authoritarian	  and	  
democratic	  states	  can	  satisfy	  the	  mens	  rea	  condition	  for	  criminal	  responsibility,	  
and	  then	  only	  on	  the	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  model.	  
	   The	  fact	  that	  some	  states	  are	  not	  fit	  to	  be	  held	  criminally	  responsible	  does	  
not	  undermine	  the	  argument	  for	  state	  crime,	  any	  more	  than	  the	  fact	  that	  some	  
human	  beings	  are	  not	  fit	  to	  be	  held	  criminally	  responsible	  undermines	  domestic	  
criminal	  law.	  But	  the	  Agency	  Problem	  does	  significantly	  restrict	  the	  scope	  of	  
state	  crime,	  because	  atrocities	  are	  often	  committed	  by	  states	  that	  fail	  to	  meet	  the	  
conditions	  for	  corporate	  agency.	  Many	  of	  the	  worst	  crimes	  have	  been	  committed	  
by	  dictatorships:	  Germany	  under	  Hitler,	  Rwanda	  under	  Sindikubwabo,	  Cambodia	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  2019,	  46.	  
44	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  2019,	  46.	  Cf.	  Pasternak	  forthcoming.	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under	  Pol	  Pot,	  Iraq	  under	  Hussein,	  Liberia	  under	  Taylor—the	  list	  could	  be	  
expanded	  ad	  nauseum.	  It	  is	  true,	  of	  course,	  that	  democracies	  also	  commit	  crimes.	  
As	  Stilz	  argues,	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  are	  guilty	  of	  waging	  an	  
aggressive	  war	  against	  Iraq	  in	  2003.45	  But	  if	  dictatorships	  are	  not	  fit	  to	  be	  held	  
criminally	  responsible,	  then	  the	  scope	  of	  state	  crime	  is	  fairly	  narrow.	  And	  if,	  as	  I	  
have	  argued,	  simple	  oligarchies	  are	  also	  unfit,	  then	  the	  scope	  of	  state	  crime	  is	  
even	  narrower.	  	  
	   The	  second	  important	  implication	  of	  the	  argument	  so	  far	  is	  that	  only	  the	  
citizen-­‐exclusive	  state	  can	  legitimately	  be	  punished.	  There	  are	  many	  ways	  of	  
trying	  to	  punish	  a	  state,	  including	  war,	  economic	  sanctions,	  dissolution,	  forced	  
reform,	  fines,	  and	  ‘naming	  and	  shaming’.46	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  many	  of	  these	  
measures	  will	  inevitably	  inflict	  suffering	  on	  the	  citizens	  of	  the	  target	  state.	  Since	  
only	  (some)	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  states	  meet	  the	  conditions	  for	  corporate	  agency,	  
these	  states	  should	  be	  punished	  only	  in	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  ways.	  	  
	   The	  suffering	  inflicted	  on	  citizens	  that	  results	  from	  punishing	  their	  states	  
could	  be	  considered	  collateral	  damage	  or	  ‘overspill’	  rather	  than	  punishment	  per	  
se.47	  However,	  as	  Bill	  Wringe	  argues,	  the	  suffering	  inflicted	  on	  citizens	  often	  does	  
amount	  to	  punishment.	  According	  to	  his	  expressive	  theory,	  punishment	  is	  (1)	  
harsh	  treatment	  (2)	  in	  response	  to	  wrongdoing	  (3)	  to	  express	  societal	  
condemnation.48	  War	  or	  sanctions	  against	  a	  state	  inevitably	  impose	  harsh	  
treatment	  on	  its	  citizens.	  So	  if	  war	  or	  sanctions	  are	  undertaken	  to	  condemn	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Stilz	  2011,	  205.	  
46	  On	  the	  range	  of	  punitive	  measures	  that	  could	  be	  used	  against	  states,	  see	  Lang	  
2008,	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5;	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  2019,	  144;	  Vernon	  2011,	  304-­‐5;	  Wringe	  
2016,	  Chapter	  8.	  
47	  Erskine	  2010.	  
48	  Wringe	  2016,	  especially	  Chapters	  2-­‐4.	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wrongdoing,	  then	  the	  harsh	  treatment	  imposed	  on	  citizens	  is	  implicitly	  punitive,	  
since	  it	  meets	  the	  three	  essential	  conditions	  for	  punishment.49	  Similarly,	  though	  
less	  obviously,	  coercive	  reform	  or	  dissolution	  of	  a	  state	  would	  often	  constitute	  
punishment	  of	  its	  citizens.	  It	  is	  true,	  as	  Rousseau	  said,	  that	  ‘it	  is	  possible	  to	  kill	  
the	  State	  without	  killing	  a	  single	  one	  of	  its	  members’.50	  But	  to	  coercively	  dissolve	  
or	  reform	  a	  state	  would	  be	  to	  deny	  self-­‐determination	  to	  its	  citizens,	  which	  
would	  surely	  count	  as	  harsh	  treatment.	  Likewise,	  and	  more	  obviously,	  large	  fines	  
against	  a	  state	  would	  inevitably	  inflict	  harsh	  treatment,	  and	  hence	  punishment,	  
on	  its	  citizens.	  These	  measures	  would	  entail	  punishment	  of	  citizens	  not	  just	  
according	  to	  Wringe’s	  expressive	  theory,	  but	  according	  to	  any	  theory	  that	  takes	  
harsh	  treatment	  in	  response	  to	  wrongdoing	  to	  be	  constitutive	  of	  punishment.51	  
	   Here	  lies	  the	  central	  problem:	  only	  the	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  state	  can	  be	  held	  
criminally	  responsible,	  since	  only	  the	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  state	  is	  a	  corporate	  agent,	  
but	  many	  punitive	  measures	  against	  states	  are	  inevitably	  citizen-­‐inclusive.	  	  
	   The	  range	  of	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  ways	  of	  punishing	  the	  state	  is	  limited.	  
Wringe	  suggests	  that	  the	  most	  promising	  method	  of	  punishing	  a	  state	  is	  to	  
impose	  ‘status	  measures’,	  which	  downgrade	  the	  target	  state’s	  status	  in	  the	  
‘international	  community’	  or	  restrict	  some	  of	  the	  target	  state’s	  rights	  and	  
privileges.52	  Cultural	  boycotts	  and	  suspensions	  of	  membership	  in	  international	  
organizations	  are	  paradigmatic	  status	  measures.	  Wringe	  argues	  that	  ‘status	  
measures	  need	  not	  necessarily	  involve	  harsh	  treatment	  of	  the	  citizens	  of	  a	  state’,	  
though	  he	  does	  acknowledge	  that	  ‘they	  will	  often	  involve	  actions	  which	  harm	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  Wringe	  2016,	  162-­‐73.	  See	  also	  Luban	  2011b,	  326-­‐327.	  	  
50	  Rousseau	  1997,	  47.	  
51	  E.g.,	  Lang	  2008,	  11.	  
52	  Wringe	  2016,	  166-­‐70.	  See	  also	  Vernon	  2011,	  304-­‐5.	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interests	  of	  the	  citizens	  of	  a	  state	  against	  which	  they	  are	  taken’.	  Fines	  against	  a	  
state	  could	  also	  be	  citizen-­‐exclusive,	  provided	  that	  they	  are	  relatively	  small.	  For	  
instance,	  a	  fine	  of	  $10	  million	  against	  the	  United	  States	  would	  be	  so	  small	  
relative	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  federal	  budget	  that	  the	  effect	  on	  any	  individual	  citizen	  
would	  be	  negligible.53	  ‘Smart	  sanctions’	  against	  state	  officials	  are	  another	  way	  of	  
punishing	  the	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  state.	  There	  may	  well	  be	  other	  ways.	  The	  
important	  point	  here	  is	  that	  if	  only	  the	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  state	  counts	  as	  a	  
corporate	  agent,	  then	  several	  major	  options	  for	  punishing	  the	  state	  are	  ruled	  out:	  
war,	  economic	  sanctions,	  and	  large	  fines.	  The	  Agency	  Problem	  thus	  limits	  both	  
the	  kinds	  of	  states	  that	  can	  be	  held	  criminally	  responsible	  and	  the	  kinds	  of	  
measures	  that	  can	  be	  used	  to	  punish	  states.	  
	   There	  is	  one	  formidable	  response	  to	  the	  Agency	  Problem.	  Even	  if	  agency	  
is	  a	  conceptual	  precondition	  for	  criminal	  responsibility,	  it	  might	  also	  be	  the	  case	  
that	  criminal	  responsibility	  helps	  to	  bring	  agents	  into	  being.	  As	  Lang	  argues,	  
‘punitive	  practices	  not	  only	  punish	  agents[;]	  they	  construct	  agents	  ...	  punishment	  
creates	  norms,	  but	  it	  also	  creates	  the	  very	  agents	  who	  can	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  
such	  violations’.54	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  agent-­‐constituting	  function,	  which	  is	  
served	  by	  corporate	  law	  in	  the	  domestic	  realm,	  could	  be	  served	  by	  punishment	  
in	  the	  international	  realm.	  Christian	  List	  and	  Philip	  Pettit	  argue	  that	  holding	  a	  
deficient	  agent	  or	  non-­‐agent	  responsible	  can	  ‘responsibilize’	  it,	  or	  transform	  it	  
into	  an	  agent	  that	  is	  fit	  to	  be	  held	  responsible.	  Although	  young	  children	  are	  not	  
full	  moral	  agents,	  holding	  them	  responsible	  despite	  their	  lack	  of	  moral	  agency	  
helps	  them	  to	  develop	  into	  full	  moral	  agents.	  Similarly,	  although	  a	  dictator	  might	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Fleming	  forthcoming,	  Chapter	  5;	  Crawford	  and	  Watkins	  2010,	  293-­‐95.	  	  
54	  Lang	  2008,	  134.	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actually	  be	  the	  culpable	  agent,	  holding	  the	  whole	  state	  responsible	  for	  his	  crimes	  
might	  give	  citizens	  an	  incentive	  to	  refashion	  the	  state	  into	  a	  genuine	  corporate	  
agent.55	  The	  solution	  to	  the	  Agency	  Problem	  could	  thus	  be	  to	  turn	  the	  problem	  
on	  its	  head.	  The	  way	  to	  transform	  a	  deficient	  state	  into	  a	  well-­‐constituted	  agent	  
might	  be	  to	  punish	  the	  state	  despite	  its	  lack	  of	  agency.	  
	   It	  is	  true	  that	  holding	  a	  deficient	  state	  responsible	  can	  sometimes	  have	  a	  
developmental	  effect.	  For	  instance,	  public	  debt	  helped	  to	  transform	  the	  United	  
States	  from	  a	  loose	  confederation	  into	  a	  federal	  union.	  Although	  the	  United	  
States	  at	  first	  failed	  to	  function	  as	  a	  competent	  agent,	  since	  the	  individual	  states	  
were	  unable	  to	  act	  together	  to	  service	  the	  national	  debt,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  United	  
States	  had	  debt	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  serviced	  became	  a	  reason	  to	  develop	  a	  more	  
centralized	  decision-­‐making	  structure.	  As	  Alexander	  Hamilton	  famously	  argued,	  
‘the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  Union,	  in	  respect	  to	  revenue,	  must	  necessarily	  be	  
empowered	  to	  extend	  ...	  for	  the	  payment	  of	  the	  national	  debts	  contracted’.56	  In	  
List	  and	  Pettit’s	  terms,	  the	  debt	  helped	  to	  ‘responsibilize’	  the	  nascent	  United	  
States.	  
	   However,	  it	  is	  far	  from	  clear	  that	  punishment	  is	  an	  effective	  way	  of	  
responsibilizing	  states.	  The	  literature	  on	  economic	  sanctions	  casts	  doubt	  on	  the	  
idea	  that	  punishing	  states	  would	  have	  an	  agency-­‐developing	  effect.	  First	  of	  all,	  
economic	  sanctions	  are	  not	  very	  effective	  in	  general,	  even	  for	  inducing	  modest	  
changes	  in	  policy	  in	  the	  target	  state.	  At	  best,	  sanctions	  achieve	  their	  stated	  
objectives	  about	  one	  third	  of	  the	  time;	  at	  worst,	  they	  rarely	  achieve	  their	  stated	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  List	  and	  Pettit	  2011,	  167-­‐69.	  
56	  Hamilton	  2003,	  137.	  See	  also	  Wright	  2008,	  Chapters	  3	  and	  4.	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objectives.57	  Second,	  sanctions	  are	  even	  less	  effective	  at	  inducing	  regime	  change	  
and,	  in	  some	  cases,	  actually	  help	  the	  target	  regimes	  to	  consolidate	  power.58	  
Third,	  ‘sanctions	  are	  less	  likely	  to	  succeed	  against	  a	  nondemocratic	  target	  than	  
against	  a	  democratic	  target’.59	  Deficient	  corporate	  agents	  are	  thus	  the	  least	  likely	  
to	  respond	  to	  sanctions.	  Even	  if	  debts	  and	  treaty	  obligations	  tend	  to	  have	  an	  
agency-­‐developing	  effect,	  as	  in	  the	  early	  United	  States,	  it	  is	  doubtful	  that	  
sanctions	  have	  this	  effect.	  
	   Of	  course,	  there	  are	  other	  ways	  in	  which	  states	  could	  be	  punished:	  fines,	  
war,	  occupation,	  forced	  reform,	  dissolution,	  or	  status	  measures.	  The	  fact	  that	  
sanctions	  are	  not	  effective	  means	  of	  responsibilizing	  states	  does	  not	  necessarily	  
mean	  that	  other	  punitive	  measures	  would	  also	  be	  ineffective.	  As	  it	  stands,	  there	  
is	  insufficient	  evidence,	  but	  the	  literature	  on	  corporate	  punishment	  does	  not	  
bode	  well	  either:	  ‘corporate	  criminal	  punishment	  has	  roundly	  failed’,	  even	  at	  the	  
comparatively	  modest	  task	  of	  deterring	  misconduct.60	  Until	  there	  is	  some	  
evidence	  that	  punishing	  states	  would	  have	  an	  agency-­‐developing	  effect,	  the	  
Agency	  Problem	  remains.	  Since	  there	  is	  no	  ‘international	  corporate	  law’	  that	  
regulates	  the	  internal	  structures	  of	  states,	  many	  states	  fail	  to	  meet	  the	  conditions	  
for	  corporate	  agency,	  and	  hence	  for	  criminal	  responsibility.	  The	  states	  that	  do	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57	  Hufbauer	  et	  al.	  2007;	  cf.	  Pape	  1997,	  1998.	  
58	  Lindsay	  1986.	  Marinov	  2005	  finds	  that	  sanctions	  tend	  to	  produce	  more	  
frequent	  leadership	  changes,	  but	  this	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  that	  sanctions	  
produce	  more	  frequent	  regime	  changes.	  He	  also	  finds	  that	  the	  destabilizing	  effect	  
of	  sanctions	  is	  much	  stronger	  in	  democracies.	  
59	  Lektzian	  and	  Souva	  2007,	  848.	  See	  also	  Allen	  2005,	  2008;	  Nossal	  1999.	  
60	  Thomas	  2017,	  603.	  In	  particular,	  financial	  penalties	  do	  not	  tend	  to	  achieve	  
their	  desired	  aims	  of	  deterring	  misconduct	  or	  of	  encouraging	  institutional	  
reform.	  Instead,	  these	  penalties	  either	  impose	  unjustified	  costs	  on	  innocent	  
employees	  and	  shareholders	  (if	  the	  penalty	  is	  severe)	  or	  fail	  to	  do	  much	  at	  all	  (if	  
the	  penalty	  is	  relatively	  mild).	  Coffee	  1981.	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meet	  the	  conditions	  are	  only	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  agents,	  and	  therefore	  can	  
legitimately	  be	  punished	  only	  in	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  ways.	  	  
	  
The	  temporal	  problem	  	  
	   How	  far	  back	  should	  the	  crimes	  of	  states	  be	  prosecuted?	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
individual	  crimes,	  the	  human	  lifespan	  marks	  the	  outer	  limit:	  criminal	  
responsibility	  dies	  with	  the	  criminal.	  But	  the	  Temporal	  Problem	  is	  far	  more	  
troublesome	  for	  state	  crimes,	  because	  states	  have	  indefinite	  lifespans.	  In	  this	  
section,	  I	  show	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  justify	  a	  time-­‐limit	  on	  the	  prosecution	  and	  
punishment	  of	  states.	  The	  argument	  for	  state	  crime	  paves	  the	  way	  for	  forms	  of	  
‘historical	  punishment’	  that	  most	  of	  its	  proponents	  would	  be	  unwilling	  to	  accept.	  
	   There	  is	  no	  statute	  of	  limitations	  on	  the	  most	  serious	  international	  crimes,	  
such	  as	  genocide	  and	  crimes	  against	  humanity.	  The	  principle	  that	  these	  crimes	  
are	  ‘imprescriptible’,	  or	  not	  subject	  to	  time-­‐limits,	  is	  well-­‐established	  in	  
international	  law	  and	  in	  many	  domestic	  legal	  systems.61	  Individual	  moral	  agents	  
can	  be	  punished	  for	  these	  crimes	  as	  long	  as	  they	  live.	  Former	  Nazis,	  and	  even	  
guards	  at	  concentration	  camps,	  continue	  to	  be	  punished	  for	  what	  they	  did	  75	  
years	  ago.	  If	  states	  are	  moral	  agents,	  which	  they	  must	  be	  if	  they	  are	  to	  be	  held	  
criminally	  responsible	  at	  all,	  then	  justice	  seems	  to	  demand	  that	  they	  be	  punished	  
for	  atrocities	  that	  they	  committed	  when	  they	  were	  ‘young’.	  For	  instance,	  the	  
United	  States	  should	  be	  punished	  for	  slavery.	  Although	  it	  has	  undergone	  many	  
changes	  in	  population,	  territory,	  and	  government,	  it	  is	  still	  the	  same	  agent:	  ‘The	  
young	  US	  with	  five	  million	  and	  the	  present	  US	  with	  [327	  million]	  of	  inhabitants	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  Van	  den	  Wyngaert	  and	  Dugard	  2002;	  UN	  2002,	  Article	  29.	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is,	  of	  course,	  the	  identical	  state	  in	  law’.62	  Corporate	  agents	  persist	  despite	  
changes	  in	  their	  constituents,	  just	  as	  human	  agents	  persist	  despite	  changes	  in	  
their	  cells.63	  	  
	   Bare	  consistency	  would	  require	  that	  the	  United	  States	  be	  punished	  for	  
slavery.	  Since	  the	  United	  States	  celebrates	  its	  past	  achievements,	  such	  as	  its	  
victory	  in	  the	  War	  of	  Independence,	  then	  the	  United	  States	  should	  own	  up	  to	  its	  
past	  crimes.	  It	  would	  be	  inconsistent	  for	  the	  state	  to	  take	  credit	  for	  its	  
achievements	  without	  taking	  responsibility	  for	  its	  wrongdoing.	  And	  if	  states	  are	  
subject	  to	  criminal	  responsibility,	  then	  the	  United	  States	  does	  not	  just	  owe	  
reparations	  for	  slavery;	  it	  ought	  to	  be	  punished	  for	  slavery.	  The	  mere	  passage	  of	  
time	  surely	  cannot	  wash	  away	  the	  crimes	  of	  slavery,	  colonialism,	  or	  genocide.	  
	   Few	  proponents	  of	  state	  crime	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  accept	  the	  implication	  
that	  states	  should	  be	  punished	  for	  historical	  crimes.	  Even	  the	  most	  ardent	  
proponents	  of	  historical	  reparations	  would	  probably	  balk	  at	  the	  idea	  of	  historical	  
punishment.	  Perhaps	  this	  is	  because	  historical	  punishment	  looks	  like	  
punishment	  of	  the	  innocent,	  or	  guilt	  by	  association.	  As	  I	  explained	  in	  the	  
previous	  section,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  punish	  a	  state	  without	  effectively	  punishing	  its	  
citizens,	  many	  of	  whom	  are	  innocent.64	  The	  risk	  of	  punishing	  the	  innocent	  would	  
be	  far	  greater	  in	  cases	  of	  historical	  crime,	  in	  which	  the	  members	  of	  the	  citizen-­‐
exclusive	  state—government	  officials—are	  as	  blameless	  as	  citizens.	  Present-­‐day	  
government	  officials	  could	  not	  possibly	  be	  culpable	  for	  historical	  crimes,	  for	  the	  
simple	  reason	  that	  they	  were	  not	  alive	  when	  the	  crimes	  were	  committed.	  So	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62	  Kunz	  1955,	  71.	  See	  Crawford	  2007,	  673-­‐80	  for	  a	  more	  recent	  analysis	  of	  state	  
identity	  in	  law.	  
63	  Erskine	  2001,	  74;	  Runciman	  2000,	  98-­‐99.	  
64	  Wringe	  2016,	  Chapter	  8.	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punish	  states	  for	  historical	  crimes,	  even	  in	  citizen-­‐exclusive	  ways,	  would	  be	  to	  
punish	  the	  innocent.	  Of	  course,	  citizens	  and	  government	  officials	  might	  inherit	  
reparative	  responsibilities	  for	  historical	  injustices,	  especially	  if	  they	  have	  
inherited	  benefits.65	  But	  inherited	  culpability	  would	  be	  a	  form	  of	  guilt	  by	  
association.	  In	  any	  case,	  the	  fact	  that	  calls	  for	  historical	  reparations	  are	  common,	  
whereas	  calls	  for	  historical	  punishment	  are	  not,	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  some	  
widespread	  intuition	  against	  historical	  punishment.	  
	   There	  are	  several	  ways	  that	  proponents	  of	  state	  crime	  could	  try	  to	  avoid	  
the	  implication	  that	  states	  should	  be	  punished	  for	  historical	  crimes.	  First,	  it	  could	  
be	  argued	  that	  historical	  crimes	  should	  not	  be	  punished	  if	  the	  character	  of	  the	  
perpetrator	  state	  has	  fundamentally	  changed.	  Mihailis	  Diamantis	  argues	  that	  
fundamental	  changes	  in	  a	  corporation’s	  character	  can	  undermine	  the	  rationale	  
for	  punishing	  it.	  If	  a	  criminal	  corporation	  undergoes	  an	  organizational	  
transformation	  that	  eliminates	  its	  ‘criminal	  essence’,	  or	  the	  features	  that	  led	  it	  to	  
behave	  criminally,	  then	  it	  is	  essentially	  a	  new	  corporation.66	  He	  suggests	  that	  the	  
‘criminal	  essence	  theory’	  applies	  similarly	  to	  individuals,	  and	  that	  it	  helps	  to	  
justify	  statutes	  of	  limitations:	  ‘as	  time	  passes	  without	  re-­‐offense,	  it	  becomes	  
increasingly	  likely	  that	  an	  individual	  who	  committed	  a	  past	  crime	  has	  relevantly	  
different	  motivations	  and	  attitudes,	  i.e.,	  is	  a	  now	  “different	  person”’.67	  The	  same	  
argument	  could	  be	  made	  for	  states.	  The	  contemporary	  United	  States	  might	  be	  
exempt	  from	  punishment	  for	  slavery	  (if	  not	  from	  liability	  for	  reparations)	  
because	  it	  is	  fundamentally	  different	  in	  character	  from	  the	  slavery-­‐era	  United	  
States.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  Union	  purged	  its	  criminal	  essence	  by	  fighting	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  Butt	  2006.	  
66	  Diamantis	  2019.	  
67	  Diamantis	  2019,	  963.	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the	  Civil	  War,	  or	  by	  passing	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  Act	  in	  1964,	  or	  by	  implementing	  
affirmative	  action.	  	  	  
	   However,	  some	  criminal	  essences	  are	  much	  more	  durable	  than	  others,	  
and	  some	  may	  be	  almost	  impossible	  to	  purge.	  If	  a	  man	  stole	  a	  bike	  in	  his	  youth,	  
but	  he	  has	  not	  stolen	  anything	  for	  50	  years,	  then	  it	  is	  plausible	  to	  conclude	  that	  
he	  has	  shed	  his	  criminal	  essence.	  But	  if	  he	  had	  run	  a	  concentration	  camp	  in	  his	  
youth,	  then	  it	  is	  far	  from	  clear	  that	  50	  years	  of	  good	  behaviour	  can	  erase	  his	  
criminal	  essence.	  Orchestrating	  a	  genocide	  leaves	  a	  much	  more	  permanent	  mark	  
on	  the	  character	  of	  a	  person	  than	  does	  stealing	  a	  bike.	  This	  is	  perhaps	  why	  
Germany	  continues	  to	  prosecute	  Nazis	  long	  after	  the	  fact,	  and	  why	  the	  most	  
serious	  international	  crimes	  are	  not	  subject	  to	  a	  statute	  of	  limitations.	  Similarly,	  
slavery	  has	  left	  a	  mark	  on	  the	  character	  of	  the	  United	  States	  that	  is	  not	  easily	  
erased	  by	  institutional	  reforms	  or	  the	  passage	  of	  time.	  As	  many	  would	  be	  quick	  
to	  point	  out,	  America’s	  ‘change	  of	  heart’	  is	  easy	  to	  overstate:	  slavery	  gave	  way	  to	  
Jim	  Crow	  laws	  and	  segregation,	  and	  the	  legacy	  of	  slavery	  lives	  on	  in	  the	  form	  of	  
racism	  and	  mass	  incarceration.68	  The	  criminal	  essence	  theory	  leaves	  plenty	  of	  
room	  for	  historical	  punishment,	  because	  the	  criminal	  essences	  of	  slavery	  and	  
genocide	  are	  deep	  and	  long-­‐lasting.	  	  
	   The	  legal	  principle	  of	  nullum	  crimen,	  nulla	  poena	  sine	  lege—no	  crime,	  no	  	  
penalty	  without	  a	  (prior)	  law—provides	  a	  more	  plausible	  justification	  for	  placing	  
a	  time-­‐limit	  on	  the	  punishment	  of	  states.69	  An	  agent	  cannot	  be	  punished	  
retroactively	  for	  an	  act	  that	  was	  not	  a	  crime	  when	  it	  was	  performed.	  This	  
principle	  is	  central	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  is	  codified	  in	  several	  human	  rights	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  Acharya,	  Blackwell,	  and	  Sen	  2016;	  Alexander	  2011.	  
69	  See	  Schabas	  2012,	  Chapter	  2	  on	  the	  role	  of	  nullum	  crimen	  in	  international	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treaties.70	  Although	  enslavement	  is	  now	  a	  ‘crime	  against	  humanity’,71	  the	  
present-­‐day	  United	  States	  could	  claim	  immunity	  from	  punishment	  on	  the	  ground	  
that	  slavery	  was	  abolished	  in	  the	  United	  States	  long	  before	  slavery	  became	  an	  
international	  crime.	  The	  principle	  of	  nullum	  crimen	  thus	  seems	  to	  allow	  
proponents	  of	  state	  crime	  to	  avoid	  the	  conclusion	  that	  states	  should	  be	  punished	  
for	  historical	  crimes.	  	  
	   But	  the	  limit	  set	  by	  nullum	  crimen	  is	  weaker	  than	  it	  seems.	  An	  act	  need	  
not	  be	  specifically	  prohibited	  by	  a	  statute	  or	  treaty	  in	  order	  to	  be	  criminal;	  the	  
act	  need	  only	  be	  prohibited	  by	  customary	  international	  law.	  For	  instance,	  as	  
Christian	  Tomuschat	  argues,	  the	  Nuremberg	  Tribunal’s	  prosecution	  of	  ‘crimes	  
against	  humanity’	  did	  not	  violate	  nullum	  crimen	  because	  the	  actions	  that	  
constituted	  these	  crimes	  were	  already	  illegal:	  ‘crimes	  against	  humanity	  could	  be	  
conceived	  of	  as	  an	  amalgamation	  of	  the	  core	  substance	  of	  criminal	  law	  to	  be	  
encountered	  in	  the	  criminal	  codes	  of	  all	  “civilized”	  nations’.72	  Similarly,	  
punishing	  states	  for	  historical	  crimes	  would	  not	  violate	  nullum	  crimen	  as	  long	  as	  
the	  acts	  in	  question	  were	  illegal	  under	  customary	  law	  at	  the	  time	  they	  were	  
committed.	  Slavery	  was	  probably	  illegal	  under	  customary	  international	  law	  even	  
in	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  and,	  even	  at	  that	  time,	  it	  was	  often	  described	  as	  a	  
‘crime	  against	  humanity’.73	  The	  rule	  against	  retroactive	  punishment	  thus	  does	  
not	  always	  rule	  out	  punishing	  present-­‐day	  states	  for	  historical	  crimes.	  
	   One	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  not	  subject	  to	  the	  customary	  
prohibition	  of	  slavery	  because	  it	  was	  a	  ‘persistent	  objector’	  to	  that	  custom.	  But	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  E.g.,	  ECHR	  1953,	  Article	  7;	  UN	  1976,	  Article	  15.	  
71	  UN	  2002,	  Article	  7.	  
72	  Tomuschat	  2006,	  834.	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the	  persistent	  objector	  rule	  is	  controversial	  at	  best.	  Compiling	  many	  previous	  
criticisms,	  Patrick	  Dumberry	  argues	  that	  this	  rule	  has	  weak	  judicial	  recognition,	  
is	  unsupported	  by	  state	  practice,	  and	  is	  logically	  incoherent.74	  He	  also	  shows	  that	  
the	  very	  idea	  of	  the	  persistent	  objector	  is	  fairly	  new:	  ‘Although	  the	  concept	  of	  
persistent	  objector	  can	  be	  traced	  back	  to	  more	  than	  50	  years	  ago,	  it	  only	  truly	  
emerged	  as	  a	  coherent	  theory	  some	  20	  years	  ago	  when	  it	  was	  embraced	  by	  the	  
United	  States’.75	  If	  the	  customary	  prohibition	  of	  slavery	  preceded	  the	  persistent	  
objector	  rule,	  then	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  that	  rule	  could	  exempt	  the	  United	  States	  
from	  that	  custom.	  Moreover,	  the	  persistent	  objector	  rule	  does	  not	  apply	  to	  
peremptory	  norms,	  or	  jus	  cogens.76	  In	  any	  case,	  American	  slavery	  is	  only	  one	  
among	  many	  examples	  of	  historical	  crime,	  most	  of	  which	  do	  not	  raise	  the	  issue	  of	  
persistent	  objection.	  Should	  Turkey	  be	  punished	  for	  the	  Armenian	  Genocide?77	  
Should	  Italy	  be	  punished	  for	  aggression	  against	  Ethiopia	  in	  the	  1930s?	  Should	  
Belgium	  be	  punished	  for	  atrocities	  committed	  in	  the	  Congo	  Free	  State?	  
	  	   The	  Temporal	  Problem	  is	  troublesome	  even	  for	  more	  recent	  state	  crimes.	  
Consider	  the	  1968	  Mai	  Lai	  Massacre,	  in	  which	  American	  soldiers	  killed	  hundreds	  
of	  unarmed	  Vietnamese	  civilians.	  The	  Massacre	  was	  not	  just	  an	  act	  of	  a	  few	  rogue	  
soldiers;	  it	  could	  plausibly	  be	  described	  as	  an	  act	  of	  the	  United	  States.78	  Should	  
the	  United	  States	  still	  be	  punished	  for	  this	  crime?	  Few	  people	  would	  think	  so,	  
even	  if	  they	  did	  think	  the	  United	  States	  should	  still	  apologize	  or	  pay	  reparations.	  
But	  the	  argument	  for	  state	  crime	  leads	  almost	  inescapably	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	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the	  United	  States	  should	  still	  be	  punished.	  The	  passage	  of	  a	  few	  decades	  surely	  
does	  not	  absolve	  an	  agent	  of	  responsibility	  for	  war	  crimes.	  If	  the	  individual	  moral	  
agents	  who	  perpetrated	  or	  orchestrated	  the	  massacre	  should	  still	  be	  punished,	  
then	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  why	  the	  relevant	  corporate	  moral	  agents	  should	  be	  granted	  
impunity.	  
	   Proponents	  of	  state	  crime	  could	  deal	  with	  the	  Temporal	  Problem	  in	  one	  of	  
two	  ways.	  First,	  they	  could	  bite	  the	  bullet	  and	  accept	  the	  implication	  that	  states	  
should	  be	  punished	  for	  historical	  crimes.	  This	  would	  require	  an	  argument	  that	  
explains	  why	  the	  common	  intuition	  against	  historical	  punishment	  is	  mistaken.	  
Second,	  proponents	  of	  state	  crime	  could	  argue	  for	  a	  time-­‐limit	  on	  the	  
prosecution	  and	  punishment	  of	  states.	  As	  I	  have	  shown,	  this	  argument	  would	  not	  
be	  easy	  to	  make.	  The	  obvious	  justifications	  for	  a	  time-­‐limit,	  such	  as	  changes	  of	  
character	  and	  nullum	  crimen,	  are	  not	  of	  much	  help.	  In	  addition,	  any	  argument	  for	  
a	  statute	  of	  limitations	  on	  state	  crimes	  would	  have	  to	  be	  reconciled	  with	  the	  fact	  
that	  serious	  international	  crimes	  committed	  by	  individuals—many	  of	  which	  also	  
constitute	  state	  crimes—are	  not	  subject	  to	  a	  statute	  of	  limitations.	  	  
	   One	  way	  to	  blunt	  the	  force	  of	  the	  Temporal	  Problem	  is	  to	  admit	  the	  force	  
of	  the	  Agency	  Problem.	  If,	  as	  I	  have	  argued,	  dictatorships	  and	  simple	  oligarchies	  
do	  not	  meet	  the	  conditions	  for	  corporate	  agency,	  then	  many	  historical	  crimes	  are	  
not	  attributable	  to	  states	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Criminal	  responsibility	  for	  Belgium’s	  
atrocities	  in	  the	  Congo	  would	  have	  died	  with	  Leopold	  II	  (though,	  again,	  
reparative	  responsibility	  might	  live	  on).	  The	  fact	  that	  there	  were	  more	  
dictatorships	  and	  simple	  oligarchies	  in	  the	  past	  mitigates	  the	  Temporal	  Problem.	  
But	  this	  fact	  also	  restricts	  the	  scope	  of	  state	  crime	  in	  the	  present.	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State	  responsibility	  without	  criminal	  responsibility	  
	   So	  far,	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  holding	  states	  criminally	  responsible	  is	  fraught	  
with	  conceptual	  and	  practical	  difficulties.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  argue	  that	  abandoning	  
the	  idea	  of	  state	  crime	  would	  be	  no	  great	  loss.	  All	  of	  the	  important	  functions	  of	  
responsibility	  can	  be	  served	  by	  a	  reparative	  system	  of	  state	  responsibility	  in	  
conjunction	  with	  criminal	  trials	  of	  individuals.	  	  
	   One	  formidable	  argument	  for	  reviving	  punitive	  conceptions	  of	  state	  
responsibility	  is	  that	  their	  decline	  in	  the	  Twentieth	  Century	  has	  hollowed	  out	  the	  
moral	  vocabulary	  of	  international	  law.	  As	  Gabriella	  Blum	  argues,	  the	  moral	  
language	  of	  punishment	  has	  been	  replaced	  by	  the	  language	  of	  ‘value-­‐neutral	  
“prevention”’;	  ‘what	  is	  lost	  by	  a	  reliance	  on	  a	  preventive	  paradigm’	  is	  ‘the	  moral	  
evaluation	  of	  state	  conduct’.79	  Similarly,	  Lang	  argues	  that	  liberal	  internationalism	  
has	  replaced	  ‘punitive	  action’	  against	  states	  with	  ‘strategic	  action’.80	  The	  result	  is	  
that	  sanctions	  and	  interventions	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  justified	  in	  moral	  terms	  as	  
means	  of	  punishing	  criminal	  states.	  Instead,	  they	  can	  be	  justified	  only	  in	  strategic	  
terms	  as	  means	  of	  preventing	  or	  neutralizing	  threats.	  	  
	   Blum	  argues	  that	  the	  shift	  from	  punishment	  to	  prevention	  is	  not	  as	  
progressive	  as	  it	  seems.	  Although	  ‘prevention	  may	  sound	  like	  a	  less	  oppressive	  
policy	  than	  punishment,	  it	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  far	  less	  constrained	  and	  more	  
ruthless’.81	  Whereas	  punishment	  requires	  due	  process	  and	  proportionality,	  
prevention	  does	  not.	  In	  addition,	  ‘a	  punitive	  framework	  is	  generally	  more	  
restrictive	  in	  what	  it	  allows	  by	  way	  of	  sanctions	  in	  anticipation	  of	  crimes’.82	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  Blum	  2013,	  59,	  110.	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  Lang	  2008,	  5.	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  2013,	  61.	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  Ibid.	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Preemptive	  wars	  are	  much	  easier	  to	  justify	  as	  ‘strategic	  action’	  than	  as	  ‘punitive	  
action’,	  since	  punishment	  is	  inherently	  backward-­‐looking.	  
	   It	  is	  undoubtedly	  true	  that	  prevention	  can	  be	  less	  constrained	  and	  more	  
ruthless	  than	  punishment.	  It	  is	  also	  true	  that	  state	  responsibility	  requires	  a	  
moral	  vocabulary.	  But	  the	  choice	  we	  face	  is	  not	  just	  between	  the	  moral	  
vocabulary	  of	  punishment	  and	  the	  strategic	  vocabulary	  of	  threat-­‐prevention.	  
There	  is	  an	  alternative	  moral	  vocabulary	  of	  reparation,	  which	  is	  the	  vocabulary	  





	   1.	  The	  responsible	  State	  is	  under	  an	  obligation	  to	  make	  full	  reparation	  for	  
	   the	  injury	  caused	  by	  the	  internationally	  wrongful	  act.	  	  
	   2.	  Injury	  includes	  any	  damage,	  whether	  material	  or	  moral,	  caused	  by	  the	  
	   internationally	  wrongful	  act	  of	  a	  State.83	  
	  
Abandoning	  the	  concept	  of	  state	  crime	  does	  not	  leave	  international	  law	  in	  the	  
moral	  vacuum	  of	  prevention,	  because	  state	  responsibility	  can	  instead	  be	  
understood	  in	  reparative	  terms.	  
	   The	  literature	  on	  reparations	  and	  transitional	  justice	  identifies	  a	  broad	  
range	  of	  possible	  responses	  to	  atrocity:	  (1)	  acknowledgment	  of	  wrongdoing,	  as	  in	  
an	  official	  apology	  or	  a	  truth	  commission;	  (2)	  punishment	  of	  the	  perpetrators;	  (3)	  
compensation	  of	  the	  victims;	  (4)	  lustration,	  or	  removal	  of	  officials	  who	  were	  
complicit	  in	  the	  wrongdoing;	  (5)	  rehabilitation	  of	  the	  perpetrators;	  and	  (6)	  
reconciliation,	  which	  usually	  involves	  some	  combination	  of	  the	  above.84	  Each	  of	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  ILC	  2001,	  Article	  31.	  
84	  The	  literature	  on	  these	  subjects	  is	  vast,	  but	  see	  Cohen	  1995	  and	  Torpey	  2006	  
for	  helpful	  overviews.	  Lu	  2017	  will	  probably	  be	  the	  definitive	  account	  for	  years	  
to	  come.	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these	  responses	  can	  take	  individualistic	  or	  corporate	  forms.	  Acknowledgment	  
can	  take	  the	  form	  of	  individual	  apologies	  or	  of	  state-­‐sanctioned	  recognition	  of	  
the	  wrongdoing.	  Compensation	  can	  be	  paid	  by	  individual	  wrongdoers	  or	  by	  the	  
state.	  Lustration	  can	  apply	  to	  particular	  individuals	  or	  to	  all	  members	  of	  a	  party	  
or	  regime.	  Punishment	  can	  target	  particular	  individuals	  or	  the	  state	  as	  a	  whole.	  
Rehabilitation	  can	  aim	  to	  change	  the	  attitudes	  of	  particular	  wrongdoers	  or	  to	  
reform	  institutions.	  Reconciliation	  can	  aim	  to	  reconcile	  the	  victims	  with	  their	  
neighbours	  or	  with	  the	  state	  itself.	  
	   This	  typology	  of	  responses	  to	  atrocity	  is	  rough	  and	  non-­‐comprehensive,	  
and	  the	  distinction	  between	  individual	  and	  corporate	  responses	  is	  not	  always	  so	  
clear	  in	  practice.	  For	  my	  purposes,	  there	  are	  two	  important	  points.	  The	  first	  is	  
that	  punishing	  the	  state	  is	  only	  one	  of	  many	  possible	  responses	  to	  atrocity.	  The	  
second	  point	  is	  that,	  of	  all	  of	  these	  responses,	  punishing	  the	  state	  is	  the	  only	  one	  
that	  requires	  the	  concept	  of	  state	  crime.	  Acknowledgment,	  compensation,	  
lustration,	  rehabilitation,	  and	  reconciliation	  can	  all	  be	  justified	  in	  purely	  
reparative	  terms.	  Abandoning	  state	  punishment	  would	  still	  leave	  a	  rich	  and	  
varied	  set	  of	  options.	  
	   One	  could	  argue	  that	  some	  of	  these	  ‘reparative’	  responses	  to	  atrocity	  are	  
punishments	  in	  disguise.	  As	  I	  have	  previously	  acknowledged,	  reform	  and	  
reparations	  can	  become	  implicitly	  punitive	  (according	  to	  Wringe’s	  expressive	  
theory)	  when	  they	  inflict	  harsh	  treatment	  on	  citizens.	  But	  reparative	  measures	  
are	  not	  necessarily	  punitive	  because	  they	  are	  not	  necessarily	  harsh	  or	  
expressive.	  Lustration	  may	  be	  harsh,	  but	  it	  need	  not	  be	  expressive;	  the	  targeted	  
officials	  need	  not	  be	  publicly	  named,	  blamed,	  or	  shamed.	  Public	  apologies	  are	  
expressive,	  but	  they	  need	  not	  be	  harsh;	  to	  repent	  is	  not	  necessarily	  to	  suffer.	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Compensation	  will	  almost	  always	  be	  expressive,85	  but	  it	  need	  not	  be	  harsh.	  If	  
compensation	  payments	  are	  small	  relative	  to	  the	  size	  of	  the	  state’s	  budget,	  then	  
no	  one	  will	  suffer	  from	  them.	  Rehabilitative	  measures	  need	  not	  be	  expressive—
states	  could	  be	  ‘nudged’	  to	  change	  their	  behaviour	  or	  institutions—and	  they	  can	  
be	  beneficial	  (as	  in	  some	  post-­‐war	  reconstruction	  projects).	  When	  supposedly	  
reparative	  measures	  start	  to	  become	  punitive,	  that	  is	  a	  sign	  that	  they	  have	  gone	  
awry.	   	  
	   It	  may	  be	  that	  punitive	  responses	  to	  serious	  international	  crimes	  are	  
necessary,	  either	  to	  express	  condemnation	  or	  to	  provide	  an	  outlet	  for	  retributive	  
impulses.	  Lang	  argues	  that	  punishment	  is	  essential	  for	  a	  just	  international	  
order.86	  But	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  states	  must	  be	  subject	  to	  punishment.	  An	  
outlet	  for	  punishment	  can	  already	  be	  found	  in	  criminal	  trials	  of	  individuals.	  
However,	  proponents	  of	  state	  crime	  might	  reply	  that	  punishing	  individuals	  is	  not	  
an	  adequate	  substitute	  for	  punishing	  the	  state.	  Since	  the	  state	  is	  a	  distinct	  agent,	  
its	  criminality	  is	  not	  reducible	  to	  the	  criminality	  of	  its	  members.	  As	  Lang	  argues,	  
individual	  criminality	  and	  state	  criminality	  are	  conceptually	  distinct:	  ‘crimes	  can	  
be	  attributed	  to	  states	  without	  attributing	  them	  to	  individuals’.87	  And	  when	  a	  
state	  commits	  a	  crime,	  the	  state	  itself	  should	  be	  punished.	  
	   It	  is	  generally	  true	  that	  individual	  forms	  of	  responsibility	  are	  not	  
adequate	  substitutes	  for	  collective	  forms	  of	  responsibility.	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  imagine	  non-­‐expressive	  compensation,	  which	  is	  paid	  in	  secret.	  
Covert	  compensation	  would	  not	  be	  punitive	  but	  might	  be	  undesirable	  for	  other	  
reasons.	  
86	  Lang	  2008.	  
87	  Lang	  2007,	  245,	  emphasis	  in	  original.	  See	  also	  Pettit	  2007;	  Tanguay-­‐Renaud	  
2013.	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insights	  from	  the	  literature	  on	  corporate	  responsibility.88	  As	  Anna	  Stilz	  argues,	  
holding	  only	  individuals	  responsible	  for	  corporate	  wrongdoing	  can	  result	  in	  a	  
‘shortfall’	  of	  responsibility,	  since	  the	  ‘total	  harm’	  can	  be	  ‘more	  than	  the	  sum	  of	  
the	  employees’	  intentional	  contributions’.	  
	   On	  November	  28,	  1979,	  a	  flight	  operated	  by	  Air	  New	  Zealand	  crashed	  
	   directly	  into	  the	  side	  of	  Mount	  Erebus,	  a	  12,000	  foot	  volcano,	  killing	  all	  
	   257	  people	  aboard.	  An	  inquiry	  determined	  that	  the	  primary	  cause	  of	  the	  
	   crash	  was	  an	  inadequate	  company	  organization	  that	  led	  to	  the	  filing	  of	  a	  
	   faulty	  computer	  flight	  plan.	  In	  this	  case,	  various	  employees’	  actions	  
	   combined	  to	  create	  a	  disaster	  that	  no	  one	  employee	  could	  have	  
	   reasonably	  foreseen.	  While	  several	  people	  did	  contribute	  to	  the	  crash,	  in	  
	   isolation	  their	  separate	  actions	  seemed	  unlikely	  to	  lead	  to	  any	  disaster.89	  	  
	  
The	  families	  of	  the	  victims	  would	  be	  undercompensated	  if	  they	  could	  seek	  
compensation	  only	  from	  particular	  individuals.	  Not	  only	  do	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  
employees	  have	  good	  excuses;	  it	  is	  also	  very	  difficult	  to	  determine	  which	  
individuals	  contributed	  to	  the	  outcome,	  and	  to	  what	  extent.	  Holding	  the	  
corporation	  liable	  is	  therefore	  necessary	  to	  make	  up	  the	  shortfall.	  
	   Holding	  individuals	  responsible	  for	  atrocities	  committed	  by	  states	  would	  
often	  leave	  similar	  shortfalls.	  Although	  some	  compensation	  can	  be	  extracted	  
from	  individuals,	  it	  will	  rarely	  be	  possible	  to	  extract	  enough.	  The	  individual	  
perpetrators	  may	  be	  deceased,	  unable	  to	  pay,	  or	  simply	  impossible	  to	  identify.	  
States,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  have	  long	  lifespans	  and	  deep	  pockets.	  Responsibility	  
shortfalls	  need	  not	  be	  purely	  financial;	  there	  can	  also	  be	  shortfalls	  in	  
acknowledgment	  or	  rehabilitation.	  Although	  apologies	  from	  individuals	  might	  
give	  the	  victims	  or	  their	  families	  some	  satisfaction,	  they	  do	  not	  carry	  the	  same	  
weight	  as	  an	  official	  apology	  from	  the	  state.90	  And	  although	  it	  might	  sometimes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88	  Cooper	  1968;	  Held	  1970;	  McGary	  1986.	  
89	  Stilz	  2011,	  193.	  See	  also	  Pettit	  2007.	  
90	  See	  Lind	  2008	  and	  Nobles	  2008	  on	  state	  apologies.	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be	  possible	  to	  rehabilitate	  individual	  perpetrators	  en	  masse,	  as	  Rwanda	  has	  tried	  
to	  do,	  it	  may	  also	  be	  necessary	  to	  reform	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  state.	  The	  purpose	  
of	  holding	  states	  responsible	  is	  thus	  to	  make	  up	  for	  these	  shortfalls.	  
	   Proponents	  of	  state	  crime	  might	  argue	  that	  punishing	  individuals	  for	  
states’	  atrocities	  leaves	  a	  ‘punishment	  shortfall’,	  since	  the	  criminality	  of	  the	  state	  
is	  not	  reducible	  to	  or	  exhausted	  by	  the	  criminality	  of	  its	  members.	  However,	  the	  
desire	  to	  punish	  states	  actually	  appears	  to	  be	  parasitic	  on	  the	  desire	  to	  punish	  
guilty	  individuals.	  If,	  as	  Lang	  argues,	  the	  criminality	  of	  the	  state	  were	  
independent	  of	  the	  criminality	  of	  individuals,	  then	  the	  desire	  to	  punish	  a	  state	  
should	  be	  unaffected	  by	  generational	  turnovers	  in	  its	  citizenship	  or	  by	  changes	  in	  
its	  government.	  But	  the	  desire	  to	  punish	  a	  state	  tends	  to	  wane	  when	  the	  
wrongdoers	  have	  died	  or	  left	  office.	  No	  one	  seriously	  proposes	  that	  Turkey	  
should	  be	  punished	  for	  the	  Armenian	  Genocide	  or	  that	  the	  United	  States	  should	  
be	  punished	  for	  slavery—or	  even	  for	  the	  Mai	  Lai	  Massacre.	  	  
	   Consider	  the	  asymmetry	  between	  reparations	  and	  punishment.	  Demands	  
for	  reparations	  from	  states	  tend	  to	  persist	  long	  after	  the	  deaths	  of	  the	  individual	  
wrongdoers,	  which	  demonstrates	  that	  these	  demands	  are	  genuinely	  ‘corporate’.	  
Demands	  for	  punishment	  of	  states	  tend	  to	  perish	  with	  the	  guilty	  individuals,	  
which	  suggests	  that	  these	  demands	  are	  merely	  quasi-­‐corporate	  or	  pseudo-­‐
corporate.	  The	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  no	  demands	  for	  historical	  punishment	  
alongside	  historical	  reparations	  suggests	  that	  punishing	  states	  is	  a	  not	  a	  
response	  to	  a	  shortfall;	  it	  is	  a	  shortcut	  to	  punishing	  guilty	  individuals	  en	  masse.	  
	   If	  the	  desire	  to	  punish	  states	  is	  parasitic	  on	  the	  desire	  to	  punish	  guilty	  
individuals,	  then	  criminal	  trials	  of	  individuals	  should	  be	  an	  adequate	  outlet	  for	  
punishment	  after	  all.	  As	  it	  stands,	  there	  is	  a	  ‘division	  of	  labour’	  in	  international	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law	  between	  individual	  responsibility	  (which	  is	  punitive)	  and	  state	  
responsibility	  (which	  is	  reparative).	  International	  law	  holds	  individuals	  
responsible	  in	  order	  to	  exact	  retribution	  and	  to	  deter	  future	  crimes—in	  
particular,	  where	  domestic	  law	  is	  absent	  or	  ineffective.	  The	  International	  
Criminal	  Court	  is	  designed	  ‘to	  put	  an	  end	  to	  impunity’	  for	  ‘the	  most	  serious	  
crimes’	  and	  ‘thus	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  prevention	  of	  such	  crimes’.91	  The	  role	  of	  
state	  responsibility,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  to	  repair	  harms	  and	  compensate	  
victims.	  The	  International	  Law	  Commission’s	  Articles	  on	  State	  Responsibility	  
focus	  on	  the	  ‘twin	  obligations	  of	  cessation	  and	  reparation’,	  and	  ‘the	  burdens	  that	  
are	  imposed	  on	  delinquent	  states	  are	  exclusively	  reparative	  rather	  than	  penal	  in	  
character’.92	  Whereas	  individual	  responsibility	  is	  exclusively	  criminal,	  state	  
responsibility	  is	  more	  like	  civil	  liability.	  
	   The	  division	  of	  labour	  between	  international	  criminal	  law	  and	  state	  
responsibility	  was	  not	  a	  product	  of	  deliberate	  institutional	  design:	  ‘the	  parallel	  
developments	  of	  the	  state	  responsibility	  and	  individual	  criminal	  responsibility	  
regimes	  have	  occurred	  in	  relative	  isolation	  from	  each	  other’.93	  While	  the	  law	  of	  
state	  responsibility	  developed	  out	  of	  reparations	  law,	  international	  criminal	  law	  
grew	  out	  of	  post-­‐war	  trials.94	  There	  was	  no	  grand	  design	  in	  the	  background,	  but	  
there	  might	  as	  well	  have	  been.	  The	  two	  forms	  of	  international	  responsibility	  are	  
complementary:	  one	  serves	  reparative	  functions,	  while	  the	  other	  serves	  punitive	  
functions.	  There	  is	  no	  need	  to	  ‘criminalize’	  state	  responsibility,	  just	  as	  there	  is	  no	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91	  United	  Nations	  2002,	  Preamble.	  
92	  Crawford	  and	  Watkins	  2010,	  285-­‐86.	  
93	  Reid	  2005,	  797.	  
94	  Of	  course,	  the	  origins	  of	  each	  body	  of	  law	  are	  far	  more	  complicated	  than	  this.	  
See	  Crawford	  2013,	  3-­‐44	  on	  the	  history	  of	  state	  responsibility	  and	  Çakmak	  2017	  
on	  the	  history	  of	  international	  criminal	  law.	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need	  to	  ‘civilize’	  criminal	  trials.	  Although	  the	  two	  forms	  of	  international	  
responsibility	  may	  look	  incomplete	  in	  isolation,	  they	  fit	  together	  to	  form	  a	  
coherent	  system.	  	  
	   	  
Conclusion	  
	   I	  have	  argued	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  corporate	  crime	  cannot	  simply	  be	  mapped	  
onto	  the	  state.	  The	  international	  order	  lacks	  a	  regulatory	  framework,	  akin	  to	  
corporate	  law,	  that	  ensures	  that	  states	  actually	  meet	  the	  conditions	  for	  corporate	  
agency.	  In	  addition,	  the	  idea	  of	  state	  crime	  raises	  the	  difficult	  question	  of	  how	  far	  
back	  historical	  crimes	  should	  be	  prosecuted.	  In	  any	  case,	  abandoning	  the	  idea	  of	  
state	  crime	  would	  be	  no	  great	  loss.	  Most	  responses	  to	  atrocity	  can	  be	  justified	  in	  
reparative	  terms,	  and	  criminal	  trials	  of	  individuals	  already	  provide	  an	  adequate	  
outlet	  for	  punishment.	  
	   This	  article	  makes	  three	  main	  contributions.	  First,	  it	  presents	  the	  
strongest	  and	  most	  up-­‐to-­‐date	  case	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  state	  crime.	  I	  have	  
collected	  and	  synthesized	  several	  lines	  of	  argument	  across	  political	  theory,	  IR,	  
philosophy,	  and	  law	  that	  lend	  force	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  holding	  states	  criminally	  
responsible.	  Although	  the	  purpose	  of	  constructing	  this	  ‘steel	  man’	  was	  to	  find	  
flaws	  in	  it,	  it	  could	  also	  be	  adapted	  and	  developed	  by	  those	  who	  wish	  to	  
strengthen	  it.	  
	   The	  second	  contribution—almost	  the	  opposite	  of	  the	  first—is	  to	  develop	  
two	  new	  critiques	  of	  state	  crime.	  Previous	  critics	  focus	  on	  the	  problems	  of	  
corporate	  intent	  and	  punishment,	  which	  are	  general	  problems	  with	  collective	  
criminality.	  Instead,	  I	  focus	  on	  the	  problems	  of	  agency	  and	  time,	  which	  are	  more	  
specific	  to	  the	  state	  and	  to	  international	  relations.	  I	  thus	  show	  that	  the	  debate	  
	   36	  
about	  criminalizing	  state	  responsibility	  is	  more	  than	  a	  rerun	  of	  the	  general	  
philosophical	  debate	  about	  corporate	  criminal	  responsibility.	  The	  viability	  of	  
state	  crime	  depends	  not	  only	  on	  issues	  of	  social	  ontology,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  
structure	  of	  the	  international	  order	  and	  the	  characteristics	  of	  its	  institutions.	  
Refocusing	  the	  debate	  on	  structures	  and	  institutions	  will,	  I	  hope,	  help	  to	  
reinvigorate	  it.	  	  
	   The	  third	  contribution	  of	  the	  article	  is	  to	  provide	  a	  positive	  vision	  for	  
state	  responsibility	  without	  criminal	  responsibility.	  Oddly,	  critics	  of	  
criminalizing	  state	  responsibility	  have	  not	  developed	  a	  principled	  alternative.	  
One	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  holding	  states	  criminally	  responsible	  is	  so	  appealing	  is	  
that,	  as	  it	  stands,	  state	  responsibility	  appears	  to	  be	  normatively	  impoverished—
it	  is	  merely	  ‘non-­‐criminal’.	  The	  reparative	  conception	  of	  state	  responsibility	  that	  
I	  have	  developed	  helps	  to	  fill	  the	  moral	  vacuum	  left	  by	  the	  decline	  of	  punitive	  
conceptions	  of	  state	  responsibility.	  It	  also	  explains	  how	  state	  responsibility	  and	  
international	  criminal	  law	  fit	  together.	  While	  criminal	  trials	  of	  individuals	  
provide	  an	  outlet	  for	  punishment,	  the	  primary	  functions	  of	  state	  responsibility	  




The	  earliest	  version	  of	  this	  paper	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  presented	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  2019	  Annual	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  the	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  Cox	  and	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provided	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  feedback.	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  anonymous	  reviewers	  provided	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  comments	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  paper.	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  especially	  grateful	  to	  
Adam	  Lerner	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  comments	  on	  a	  previous	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